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Dydaktyka » EP2014-wykladJF

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22.02.2016, 13:38 wprowadził 193.0.77.6
Zmieniono linię 5 z:
  • * Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge.
to:
  •  Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge.
22.02.2016, 13:25 wprowadził 193.0.77.6
Zmieniono linie 1-2 z:

Materiały do wykładu z ekonomii poliytcznej prowadzonego przez J. Fałkowskiego (poniedziałki 16:45-18:20, s.103)

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Materiały do wykładu z ekonomii poliytcznej prowadzonego przez J. Fałkowskiego (poniedziałki 18:30-20:00, aula B)

10.03.2014, 09:58 wprowadził 193.0.77.6
Zmieniono linie 1-2 z:

Podstawowa literatura

to:

Materiały do wykładu z ekonomii poliytcznej prowadzonego przez J. Fałkowskiego (poniedziałki 16:45-18:20, s.103)

Podstawowa literatura

Zmieniono linię 9 z:

Literatura do poszczególnych wykładów (teksty oznaczone gwiazdką są obowiązkowe)

to:

Literatura do poszczególnych wykładów (teksty oznaczone gwiazdką są obowiązkowe)

09.03.2014, 14:03 wprowadził 89.71.223.24
Zmieniono linie 4-6 z:
  •  Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

to:
  • Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

09.03.2014, 13:54 wprowadził 89.71.223.24
Dodano linię 2:

09.03.2014, 13:54 wprowadził 89.71.223.24
Zmieniono linie 1-5 z:

Podstawowa literatura !!

* Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge.

  •  Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

to:

Podstawowa literatura

  • * Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge.
    •  Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

09.03.2014, 13:53 wprowadził 89.71.223.24
Zmieniono linię 1 z:

Podstawowa literatura

to:

Podstawowa literatura !!

09.03.2014, 13:53 wprowadził 89.71.223.24
Zmieniono linię 1 z:

Podstawowa literatura

to:

Podstawowa literatura

Zmieniono linię 6 z:

Literatura do poszczególnych wykładów (teksty oznaczone gwiazdką są obowiązkowe)

to:

Literatura do poszczególnych wykładów (teksty oznaczone gwiazdką są obowiązkowe)

09.03.2014, 13:52 wprowadził 89.71.223.24
Zmieniono linie 1-6 z:

Podstawowa literatura  Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics – Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

  • Literatura do poszczególnych wykładów (teksty oznaczone gwiazdką są obowiązkowe)
to:

Podstawowa literatura

* Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge.

  •  Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Literatura do poszczególnych wykładów (teksty oznaczone gwiazdką są obowiązkowe)

Zmieniono linie 8-11 z:

- (*) Besley, Timothy (2007). “The New Political Economy”, The Economic Journal, 117, 570-587. - Merlo Antonio (2005). “Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues,”, w: Blundell, R., W. Newey and T. Persson (eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Vol I, Cambridge University Press, dostęp http://www.eswc2005.com/ - Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics – Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge. rozdział 1

to:
  • (*) Besley, Timothy (2007). “The New Political Economy”, The Economic Journal, 117, 570-587.
  • Merlo Antonio (2005). “Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues,”, w: Blundell, R., W. Newey and T. Persson (eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Vol I, Cambridge University Press, dostęp http://www.eswc2005.com/
  • Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge. rozdział 1

Zmieniono linie 13-15 z:

- Acemoglu and Robinson(2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press. część 1. - (*) North, Douglass C., (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. część 1.

to:
  • Acemoglu and Robinson(2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press. część 1.
  • (*) North, Douglass C., (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. część 1.

Zmieniono linie 17-21 z:

- (*)Acemoglu, Daron (2008). Introduction to modern growth theory, Princeton University Press. – rozdział 1 i rozdział 22 - Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, (2001). “The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation”, American Economic Review 91(5), 1369-1401. - Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004). “Do institutions cause growth?”, dostęp: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/files/Institutions_Growth.pdf - Rodrik, Dani (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, Princeton University Press, 2007. rozdz. 5 i 6.

to:
  • (*)Acemoglu, Daron (2008). Introduction to modern growth theory, Princeton University Press. – rozdział 1 i rozdział 22
  • Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation, American Economic Review 91(5), 1369-1401.
  • Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004).Do institutions cause growth?, dostęp: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/files/Institutions_Growth.pdf
  • Rodrik, Dani (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, Princeton University Press, 2007. rozdz. 5 i 6.

Zmieniono linie 23-27 z:

- Acemoglu, Daron (2005). Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 (7), 1199–1226. - (*) Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2009). The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation and politics. American Economic Review 99, 1218–1244. - Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2011). Fragile states and development policy. Journal of the European Economic Association 9, 371–398. - Easterly, William (2003). ‘Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3), 23-48.

to:
  • Acemoglu, Daron (2005). Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 (7), 1199-1226.
  • (*) Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2009). The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation and politics. American Economic Review 99, 1218–1244.
  • Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2011). Fragile states and development policy. Journal of the European Economic Association 9, 371–398.
  • Easterly, William (2003). Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3), 23-48.

Zmieniono linie 29-33 z:

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared (2008), “Income and Democracy”, American Economic Review 98(3), 808-842. - Gundlach, Erich, and Martin Paldam (2009). “A farewell to critical juncture: Sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy,” European Journal of Political Economy 25(3), 340-354. - (*) Przeworski Adam and Fernando Limongi (1993) “Political Regimes and Economic Growth.”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 7, issue 3, 51-69. - Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg (2005). “Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes?” American Economic Review 95(2), 50-55.

to:
  • Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared (2008), “Income and Democracy”, American Economic Review 98(3), 808-842.
  • Gundlach, Erich, and Martin Paldam (2009). A farewell to critical juncture: Sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy, European Journal of Political Economy 25(3), 340-354.
  • (*) Przeworski Adam and Fernando Limongi (1993). Political Regimes and Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 51-69.
  • Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg (2005). Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes? American Economic Review 95(2), 50-55.

Zmieniono linie 35-38 z:

- Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Thierry Verdier (2004). “Kleptocracy and Divide and Rule: A Model of Personal Rule,” Journal of the European Economic Association 2(2-3), 162-192. - Besley & Kudamatsu (2008). “Besley, Timothy, and Masayuki Kudamatsu, “Making Autocracy Work”, w: Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press). dostęp: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/maw.pdf - (*) McGuire? and Olson (1996). “The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force,” Journal of Economic Literature 34(1), 72-96.

to:
  • Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Thierry Verdier (2004). Kleptocracy and Divide and Rule: A Model of Personal Rule, Journal of the European Economic Association 2(2-3), 162-192.
  • Besley & Kudamatsu (2008). Making Autocracy Work, w: Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press). dostęp: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/maw.pdf
  • (*) McGuire? and Olson (1996). The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force, Journal of Economic Literature 34(1), 72-96.

Zmieniono linie 40-43 z:

- Besley, Timothy (2006). Principled Agents? Lectures on the Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford University Press, rozdz. 3 - (*) Finan, F., and C. Ferraz (2005). ”Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 703-745 - Przeworski, Adam (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge University Press, rozdz. 6.

to:
  • Besley, Timothy (2006). Principled Agents? Lectures on the Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford University Press, rozdz. 3
  • (*) Finan, F., and C. Ferraz (2005). Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 703-745
  • Przeworski, Adam (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge University Press, rozdz. 6.

Zmieniono linie 45-49 z:

- Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case (2003). “Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States.” Journal of Economic Literature, 41(1), 7-73. - Giavazzi, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini (2005). “Economic and political liberalization,” Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1297-1330. - (*) Greif, Avner (2008). “The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Development: Toward Political Economy of Implementation.”, in Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press). - Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What do the Data Say?, Cambridge: MIT Press. Chapter 4.

to:
  • Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case (2003). Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States.” Journal of Economic Literature, 41(1), 7-73.
  • Giavazzi, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini (2005). Economic and political liberalization, Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1297-1330.
  • (*) Greif, Avner (2008). The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Development: Toward Political Economy of Implementation., w: Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press).
  • Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What do the Data Say?, Cambridge: MIT Press. rozdz.4.

Zmieniono linie 51-56 z:

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2006). “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective,” American Political Science Review 100(1), 115-131. - Aidt, Toke S. (2003). “Redistribution and deadweight cost: the role of political competition.” European Journal of Political Economy 19, 205-226. - Bardhan Pranab, and Tsung-Tao Yang (2004). “Political Competition in Economic Perspective,” BREAD Working Paper No. 078 July 2004. - (*) Besley, Timothy, Torsten Persson, and Daniel M. Sturm (2010). “Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States.” Review of Economic Studies - Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2005). “A drawback of electoral competition.” Journal of European Economic Association 3(6), 1318-1348.

to:
  • Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2006). Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective, American Political Science Review 100(1), 115-131.
  • Aidt, Toke S. (2003). Redistribution and deadweight cost: the role of political competition. European Journal of Political Economy 19, 205-226.
  • Bardhan Pranab, and Tsung-Tao Yang (2004). Political Competition in Economic Perspective, BREAD Working Paper No. 078 July 2004.
  • (*) Besley, Timothy, Torsten Persson, and Daniel M. Sturm (2010). Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States. Review of Economic Studies, 77, 1329-1352
  • Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2005). A drawback of electoral competition. Journal of European Economic Association 3(6), 1318-1348.

Zmieniono linie 58-61 z:

- Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess (2002). “The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1415-1451. - Dyck, Alexander, Natalya Volchkova, and Luigi Zingales (2008). "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Finance 63 (3): 1093-1135. - (*) Stromberg, David (2004). “Radio’s impact on public spending”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1).

to:
  • Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1415-1451.
  • Dyck, Alexander, Natalya Volchkova, and Luigi Zingales (2008). The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia, Journal of Finance 63 (3): 1093-1135.
  • (*) Stromberg, David (2004). Radio;s impact on public spending, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1).

Zmieniono linie 63-68 z:

- Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1995). “The Politics of Free Trade Agreements,” American Economic Review. - Helpman, Elhanan (1999). “The Structure of Foreign Trade,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(2), 121-44. - Mitra, Daveshin, Dimitrios D. Thomakos, and Mehmet A. Ulubasoglu (2002)”’Protection for Sale’ in a Developing Country: Democracy versus Dictatorship,” Review of Economics and Statistics. - (*) Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld (2009). International Economics: Theory and Policy (Boston: Addison Wesley), Eighth edition, rozdz. 9 - Krugman, Paul “What Do Undergraduates Need to Know About Trade?” NBER, dostęp: http://www.nber.org/~rosenbla/econ110/lecture/krugman.htm

to:
  • Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1995). The Politics of Free Trade Agreements, American Economic Review.
  • Helpman, Elhanan (1999). The Structure of Foreign Trade,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(2), 121-44.
  • Mitra, Daveshin, Dimitrios D. Thomakos, and Mehmet A. Ulubasoglu (2002) Protection for Sale in a Developing Country: Democracy versus Dictatorship, Review of Economics and Statistics.
  • (*) Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld (2009). International Economics: Theory and Policy (Boston: Addison Wesley), Eighth edition, rozdz. 9
  • Krugman, Paul, What Do Undergraduates Need to Know About Trade? NBER, dostęp: http://www.nber.org/~rosenbla/econ110/lecture/krugman.htm

Zmieniono linie 70-73 z:

- (*) Fisman, Raymond (2001). Estimating the Value of Political Connections. American Economic Review 91(4), 1095-1102. - Faccio, Mara (2006). Politically Connected Firms. American Economic Review 96(1), 369-86. - Marcus Goldstein and Chris Udry. 2005. “The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana.” Yale Economic Growth Center Working Paper 929. dostęp: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868655

to:
  • (*) Fisman, Raymond (2001). Estimating the Value of Political Connections. American Economic Review 91(4), 1095-1102.
  • Faccio, Mara (2006). Politically Connected Firms. American Economic Review 96(1), 369-86.
  • Marcus Goldstein and Chris Udry. 2005. The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana. Yale Economic Growth Center Working Paper 929. dostęp: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868655

Zmieniono linie 75-76 z:

- (*) Glaeser, E. (2005). Inequality. Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 2078. (on-line: http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2005papers/2005list.html) - Przeworski, A. (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge, New York, Chapter 4 (pp. 66-98).

to:
  • (*) Glaeser, E. (2005). Inequality. Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 2078. (on-line: http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2005papers/2005list.html)
  • Przeworski, A. (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge, New York, Chapter 4 (pp. 66-98).
09.03.2014, 13:42 wprowadził 89.71.223.24
Dodano linie 1-76:

Podstawowa literatura  Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics – Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

  • Literatura do poszczególnych wykładów (teksty oznaczone gwiazdką są obowiązkowe)

1. Wstęp - (*) Besley, Timothy (2007). “The New Political Economy”, The Economic Journal, 117, 570-587. - Merlo Antonio (2005). “Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues,”, w: Blundell, R., W. Newey and T. Persson (eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Vol I, Cambridge University Press, dostęp http://www.eswc2005.com/ - Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics – Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge. rozdział 1

2. Instytucje - Acemoglu and Robinson(2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press. część 1. - (*) North, Douglass C., (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. część 1.

3. Instytucje i wzrost gospodarczy - (*)Acemoglu, Daron (2008). Introduction to modern growth theory, Princeton University Press. – rozdział 1 i rozdział 22 - Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, (2001). “The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation”, American Economic Review 91(5), 1369-1401. - Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004). “Do institutions cause growth?”, dostęp: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/files/Institutions_Growth.pdf - Rodrik, Dani (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, Princeton University Press, 2007. rozdz. 5 i 6.

4. Siła państwa - Acemoglu, Daron (2005). Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 (7), 1199–1226. - (*) Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2009). The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation and politics. American Economic Review 99, 1218–1244. - Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2011). Fragile states and development policy. Journal of the European Economic Association 9, 371–398. - Easterly, William (2003). ‘Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3), 23-48.

5. Demokracja a wzrost - Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared (2008), “Income and Democracy”, American Economic Review 98(3), 808-842. - Gundlach, Erich, and Martin Paldam (2009). “A farewell to critical juncture: Sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy,” European Journal of Political Economy 25(3), 340-354. - (*) Przeworski Adam and Fernando Limongi (1993) “Political Regimes and Economic Growth.”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 7, issue 3, 51-69. - Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg (2005). “Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes?” American Economic Review 95(2), 50-55.

6. Wyniki gospodarcze w krajach autorytarnych - Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Thierry Verdier (2004). “Kleptocracy and Divide and Rule: A Model of Personal Rule,” Journal of the European Economic Association 2(2-3), 162-192. - Besley & Kudamatsu (2008). “Besley, Timothy, and Masayuki Kudamatsu, “Making Autocracy Work”, w: Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press). dostęp: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/maw.pdf - (*) McGuire? and Olson (1996). “The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force,” Journal of Economic Literature 34(1), 72-96.

7. Spojrzenie na politykę przez pryzmat problemu agencji i rozliczalności - Besley, Timothy (2006). Principled Agents? Lectures on the Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford University Press, rozdz. 3 - (*) Finan, F., and C. Ferraz (2005). ”Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 703-745 - Przeworski, Adam (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge University Press, rozdz. 6.

8. Instytucje polityczne i polityka gospodarcza - Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case (2003). “Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States.” Journal of Economic Literature, 41(1), 7-73. - Giavazzi, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini (2005). “Economic and political liberalization,” Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1297-1330. - (*) Greif, Avner (2008). “The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Development: Toward Political Economy of Implementation.”, in Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press). - Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What do the Data Say?, Cambridge: MIT Press. Chapter 4.

9. Konkurencja polityczna - Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2006). “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective,” American Political Science Review 100(1), 115-131. - Aidt, Toke S. (2003). “Redistribution and deadweight cost: the role of political competition.” European Journal of Political Economy 19, 205-226. - Bardhan Pranab, and Tsung-Tao Yang (2004). “Political Competition in Economic Perspective,” BREAD Working Paper No. 078 July 2004. - (*) Besley, Timothy, Torsten Persson, and Daniel M. Sturm (2010). “Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States.” Review of Economic Studies - Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2005). “A drawback of electoral competition.” Journal of European Economic Association 3(6), 1318-1348.

10. Ekonomia polityczna mediów - Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess (2002). “The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1415-1451. - Dyck, Alexander, Natalya Volchkova, and Luigi Zingales (2008). "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Finance 63 (3): 1093-1135. - (*) Stromberg, David (2004). “Radio’s impact on public spending”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1).

11. Ekonomia polityczna wymiany międzynarodowej - Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1995). “The Politics of Free Trade Agreements,” American Economic Review. - Helpman, Elhanan (1999). “The Structure of Foreign Trade,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(2), 121-44. - Mitra, Daveshin, Dimitrios D. Thomakos, and Mehmet A. Ulubasoglu (2002)”’Protection for Sale’ in a Developing Country: Democracy versus Dictatorship,” Review of Economics and Statistics. - (*) Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld (2009). International Economics: Theory and Policy (Boston: Addison Wesley), Eighth edition, rozdz. 9 - Krugman, Paul “What Do Undergraduates Need to Know About Trade?” NBER, dostęp: http://www.nber.org/~rosenbla/econ110/lecture/krugman.htm

12. Korzyści gospodarcze z koneksji politycznych - (*) Fisman, Raymond (2001). Estimating the Value of Political Connections. American Economic Review 91(4), 1095-1102. - Faccio, Mara (2006). Politically Connected Firms. American Economic Review 96(1), 369-86. - Marcus Goldstein and Chris Udry. 2005. “The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana.” Yale Economic Growth Center Working Paper 929. dostęp: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868655

13. Nierówności - (*) Glaeser, E. (2005). Inequality. Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 2078. (on-line: http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2005papers/2005list.html) - Przeworski, A. (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge, New York, Chapter 4 (pp. 66-98).

Data ostatniej modyfikacji: 22.02.2016, 13:38