EKONOMIA polityczna


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Dydaktyka » PE

Course given by Jan FAŁKOWSKI

This course is designed for students interested in the impact of politics on economic processes and outcomes, and the reciprocal influence of economic conditions on political life. It aims at providing a broad introduction to current research in political economy. The course is taught in lecture as well as in tutorial format.

  • Lectures take place on Mondays 15:00-16:35, room D
  • Tutorials take place on Fridays, 11:30-13:05, room D

All information about the course can be found below:

  • Evaluation
    • Assessment will be based on written examination (60 percent) and tutorials (40 percent). You have to receive positive mark for tutorials in order to be allowed to write final exam. Requirements for tutorials will be provided during first class.
    • Grades (in total from tutorials and the exam you can get 100 points):
      • below 51 pts - 2
      • 51-61,5 pts - 3
      • 62-71,5 pts - 3,5
      • 72-81,5 pts - 4
      • 82-91,5 pts - 4,5
      • 92-100 pts - 5

General references

  •  Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge.
  • Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Texts marked with (*) are obligatory

1. Introduction

  • (*) Besley, Timothy (2007). “The New Political Economy”, The Economic Journal, 117, 570-587.
  • Merlo Antonio (2005). “Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues,”, w: Blundell, R., W. Newey and T. Persson (eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Vol I, Cambridge University Press, dostęp http://www.eswc2005.com/
  • Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge. rozdział 1

2. Institutions

  • Acemoglu and Robinson(2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press. część 1.
  • (*) North, Douglass C., (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. część 1.

3. Institutions & economic growth

  • (*)Acemoglu, Daron (2008). Introduction to modern growth theory, Princeton University Press. – rozdział 1 i rozdział 22
  • Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation, American Economic Review 91(5), 1369-1401.
  • Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004).Do institutions cause growth?, dostęp: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/files/Institutions_Growth.pdf
  • Rodrik, Dani (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, Princeton University Press, 2007. rozdz. 5 i 6.

4. State capacity

  • Acemoglu, Daron (2005). Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 (7), 1199-1226.
  • (*) Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2009). The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation and politics. American Economic Review 99, 1218-1244.
  • Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2011). Fragile states and development policy. Journal of the European Economic Association 9, 371–398.
  • Easterly, William (2003). Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3), 23-48.

5. Democracy & growth

  • Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared (2008), “Income and Democracy”, American Economic Review 98(3), 808-842.
  • Gundlach, Erich, and Martin Paldam (2009). A farewell to critical juncture: Sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy, European Journal of Political Economy 25(3), 340-354.
  • (*) Przeworski Adam and Fernando Limongi (1993). Political Regimes and Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 51-69.
  • Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg (2005). Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes? American Economic Review 95(2), 50-55.

6. Authoritarian regimes & economic performance

  • Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Thierry Verdier (2004). Kleptocracy and Divide and Rule: A Model of Personal Rule, Journal of the European Economic Association 2(2-3), 162-192.
  • Besley & Kudamatsu (2008). Making Autocracy Work, w: Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press). dostęp: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/maw.pdf
  • (*) McGuire? and Olson (1996). The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force, Journal of Economic Literature 34(1), 72-96.

7. Political agency & political accountability

  • Besley, Timothy (2006). Principled Agents? Lectures on the Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford University Press, chapter 3
  • (*) Finan, F., and C. Ferraz (2005). Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 703-745
  • Przeworski, Adam (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge University Press, chapter 6.

8. Political institutions & economic policy

  • Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case (2003). Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States.” Journal of Economic Literature, 41(1), 7-73.
  • Giavazzi, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini (2005). Economic and political liberalization, Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1297-1330.
  • (*) Greif, Avner (2008). The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Development: Toward Political Economy of Implementation., w: Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press).
  • Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What do the Data Say?, Cambridge: MIT Press. chapter 4.

9. Political competition

  • Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2006). Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective, American Political Science Review 100(1), 115-131.
  • Aidt, Toke S. (2003). Redistribution and deadweight cost: the role of political competition. European Journal of Political Economy 19, 205-226.
  • Bardhan Pranab, and Tsung-Tao Yang (2004). Political Competition in Economic Perspective, BREAD Working Paper No. 078 July 2004.
  • (*) Besley, Timothy, Torsten Persson, and Daniel M. Sturm (2010). Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States. Review of Economic Studies, 77, 1329-1352
  • Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2005). A drawback of electoral competition. Journal of European Economic Association 3(6), 1318-1348.

10. Political economy of media

  • Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1415-1451.
  • Dyck, Alexander, Natalya Volchkova, and Luigi Zingales (2008). The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia, Journal of Finance 63 (3): 1093-1135.
  • (*) Stromberg, David (2004). Radio;s impact on public spending, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1).

11. Political economy & trade

  • Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1995). The Politics of Free Trade Agreements, American Economic Review.
  • Helpman, Elhanan (1999). The Structure of Foreign Trade,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(2), 121-44.
  • Mitra, Daveshin, Dimitrios D. Thomakos, and Mehmet A. Ulubasoglu (2002) Protection for Sale in a Developing Country: Democracy versus Dictatorship, Review of Economics and Statistics.
  • (*) Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld (2009). International Economics: Theory and Policy (Boston: Addison Wesley), Eighth edition, chapter 9
  • Krugman, Paul, What Do Undergraduates Need to Know About Trade? NBER, dostęp: http://www.nber.org/~rosenbla/econ110/lecture/krugman.htm

12. Economic value of politcial connections

  • (*) Fisman, Raymond (2001). Estimating the Value of Political Connections. American Economic Review 91(4), 1095-1102.
  • Faccio, Mara (2006). Politically Connected Firms. American Economic Review 96(1), 369-86.
  • Marcus Goldstein and Chris Udry. 2005. The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana. Yale Economic Growth Center Working Paper 929. dostęp: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868655

13. Inequality

Data ostatniej modyfikacji: 22.02.2016, 13:45