EKONOMIA polityczna

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Publikacje Publications

Dydaktyka14 » EP2014-wykladJF

  • * Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge.
  • Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press.

Texts marked with (*) are obligatory

1. Introduction

  • (*) Besley, Timothy (2007). “The New Political Economy”, The Economic Journal, 117, 570-587.
  • Merlo Antonio (2005). “Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues,”, w: Blundell, R., W. Newey and T. Persson (eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Vol I, Cambridge University Press, dostęp http://www.eswc2005.com/
  • Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics - Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge. rozdział 1

2. Institutions

  • Acemoglu and Robinson(2005). Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, Cambridge University Press. część 1.
  • (*) North, Douglass C., (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. część 1.

3. Institutions & economic growth

  • (*)Acemoglu, Daron (2008). Introduction to modern growth theory, Princeton University Press. – rozdział 1 i rozdział 22
  • Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation, American Economic Review 91(5), 1369-1401.
  • Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004).Do institutions cause growth?, dostęp: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/files/Institutions_Growth.pdf
  • Rodrik, Dani (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, Princeton University Press, 2007. rozdz. 5 i 6.

4. State capacity

  • Acemoglu, Daron (2005). Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 (7), 1199-1226.
  • (*) Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2009). The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation and politics. American Economic Review 99, 1218–1244.
  • Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten (2011). Fragile states and development policy. Journal of the European Economic Association 9, 371–398.
  • Easterly, William (2003). Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3), 23-48.

5. Democracy & growth

  • Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared (2008), “Income and Democracy”, American Economic Review 98(3), 808-842.
  • Gundlach, Erich, and Martin Paldam (2009). A farewell to critical juncture: Sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy, European Journal of Political Economy 25(3), 340-354.
  • (*) Przeworski Adam and Fernando Limongi (1993). Political Regimes and Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 51-69.
  • Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg (2005). Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes? American Economic Review 95(2), 50-55.

6. Authoritarian regimes & economic performance

  • Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Thierry Verdier (2004). Kleptocracy and Divide and Rule: A Model of Personal Rule, Journal of the European Economic Association 2(2-3), 162-192.
  • Besley & Kudamatsu (2008). Making Autocracy Work, w: Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press). dostęp: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/maw.pdf
  • (*) McGuire? and Olson (1996). The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force, Journal of Economic Literature 34(1), 72-96.

7. Political agency & political accountability

  • Besley, Timothy (2006). Principled Agents? Lectures on the Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford University Press, rozdz. 3
  • (*) Finan, F., and C. Ferraz (2005). Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 703-745
  • Przeworski, Adam (2010). Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge University Press, rozdz. 6.

8. Political institutions & economic policy

  • Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case (2003). Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States.” Journal of Economic Literature, 41(1), 7-73.
  • Giavazzi, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini (2005). Economic and political liberalization, Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1297-1330.
  • (*) Greif, Avner (2008). The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Development: Toward Political Economy of Implementation., w: Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Harvard, Harvard University Press).
  • Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What do the Data Say?, Cambridge: MIT Press. rozdz.4.

9. Political competition

  • Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2006). Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective, American Political Science Review 100(1), 115-131.
  • Aidt, Toke S. (2003). Redistribution and deadweight cost: the role of political competition. European Journal of Political Economy 19, 205-226.
  • Bardhan Pranab, and Tsung-Tao Yang (2004). Political Competition in Economic Perspective, BREAD Working Paper No. 078 July 2004.
  • (*) Besley, Timothy, Torsten Persson, and Daniel M. Sturm (2010). Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States. Review of Economic Studies, 77, 1329-1352
  • Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2005). A drawback of electoral competition. Journal of European Economic Association 3(6), 1318-1348.

10. Political economy of media

  • Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: theory and evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1415-1451.
  • Dyck, Alexander, Natalya Volchkova, and Luigi Zingales (2008). The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia, Journal of Finance 63 (3): 1093-1135.
  • (*) Stromberg, David (2004). Radio;s impact on public spending, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1).

11. Political economy & trade

  • Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1995). The Politics of Free Trade Agreements, American Economic Review.
  • Helpman, Elhanan (1999). The Structure of Foreign Trade,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(2), 121-44.
  • Mitra, Daveshin, Dimitrios D. Thomakos, and Mehmet A. Ulubasoglu (2002) Protection for Sale in a Developing Country: Democracy versus Dictatorship, Review of Economics and Statistics.
  • (*) Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld (2009). International Economics: Theory and Policy (Boston: Addison Wesley), Eighth edition, rozdz. 9
  • Krugman, Paul, What Do Undergraduates Need to Know About Trade? NBER, dostęp: http://www.nber.org/~rosenbla/econ110/lecture/krugman.htm

12. Economic value of politcial connections

  • (*) Fisman, Raymond (2001). Estimating the Value of Political Connections. American Economic Review 91(4), 1095-1102.
  • Faccio, Mara (2006). Politically Connected Firms. American Economic Review 96(1), 369-86.
  • Marcus Goldstein and Chris Udry. 2005. The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana. Yale Economic Growth Center Working Paper 929. dostęp: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868655

13. Inequality

Data ostatniej modyfikacji: 04.05.2015, 15:36